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PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MINNESOTA*
CLARENCE MORRIS**
PROXIMATE cause cases fall into two major categories; they
ntail either a dispute over what happened, or a dispute over
the legal consequences that attach to events.- This distinction is
crucial for advocates. The first kind of dispute calls for prepara-
tion and presentation of proof. The relevant law is, largely, the
law of procedure-the qualification of experts, the acceptability of
circumstantial evidence, the allocation of burdens of proof,-and so
on. The second kind of dispute is not settled by proof; it entails the
application of the law to the facts of a case. It calls for the prepara-
tion and presentation of skilled arguments to judge or jury-argu-
ments on the meaning and scope of substantive law as found in
precedents, opinions, texts, jury charges, and so on. This paper
will deal with each of these kinds of problems and the relations
between the two. Primarily my interest is in examining recent
Minnesota decisions for the purpose of considering the functions
of the advocates and how they best can deal with causation issues.
*In an exceptionally able article, The Minnesota Law of Proximate
Cause, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19 (1936) Dean William L. Prosser has discussed
this same subject and made a far more extensive collection Pf the Minne-
sota cases than has been made here. See also Rules Governing ProximateCause in Minnesota, 16 M~inn. L. Rev. 829 (1932). I have tried to add all
of the more important cases decided in the last 13 years. I find myself largely
in accord with Prosser's views, but this article has been written from a
different viewpoint which calls for a different organization of materials
and different emphases.
Proximate cause has been the subject of more legal writing than any
other topic in the law of torts. Prosser collects many of the important
authorities in footnote 9, page 20 of his article. To my mind the greatest
contemporary teacher of proximate cause is Professor Leon Green, whose
book, A Rationale of Proximate Cause, is well known. I have learned much
from him and from Egerton which may be hidden by our differences in
vocabulary.
**Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. Of course, both kinds of disputes may and sometimes do occur in a
single case.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. Cause in Fact-Proof Problems
Counsel who has recognized a cause-in-fact problem usually
tries to get a preliminary understanding of the connection (or lack
of it) between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's damages
without too much bother about proof. Only after he begins to
understand the facts does he plan his court-room strategy. The
reader of reported cases can seldom retrace the process and dis-
cover why one program of proof, rather than some other, was
adopted. A check list of methods of establishing cause in fact, and
a discussion of some of their practical implications may be useful
to novices and refresh the memories of the more experienced.
A. Eye-witnesses
The testimony of eye-witnesses may foreclose any dispute on
causation. If witnesses saw a motorist run over a pedestrian who
was then carted off to the hospital with a broken leg, defense
counsel is likely to concede the causal relation between the accident
and the injury. But when no one observes impact a dispute on
causal connection may occur.
In Smock v. Mankato Elks Club2 the plaintiff proved that she
went to the defendant's New Year's Eve party; much combustible
material gathered on the floor during the evening; few ash-trays
were provided for many smokers; and her dress caught on fire. But
she adduced no proof that the fire started in the rubbish. The
Supreme Court held that the proof did not support the plaintiff's
$150 verdict. Had she proved a fire in the rubbish which spread
to her dress the court might have let the verdict stand. If such were
the facts, eye-witnesses who could have testified to them would
have been most useful.
Defense counsel can also make telling use of eye-witnesses. In
Peterson v. Fulton3 the plaintiff was injured in an automobile col-
lision, and stied the drivers of three cars. The plaintiff was a pas-
senger in car #1, which was being followed by car #2. Both drivers,
in turn, failed to obey a stop sign. Car #3 was traveling on the
through street; collided with car #1, caromed off of it; and then
collided with car #2. By direct and cross-examination of eye-
witnesses, counsel for the driver of car #2 was able to establish
that all of plaintiff's injuries were incurred in the first collision.
The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence did not support a
verdict against his client.
2. 203 Minn. 265, 280 N. W. 851 (1938).
3. 192 Minn. 360, 256 N. W. 901 (1934).
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B. Expert Testimony
Sometimes the need for expert testimony is patent, and the
likelihood that opposing experts will disagree is obvious. Harris v.
Wood4 is a good example. The plaintiff's decedent died in the de-
fendant's dental chair during the administration of gas. The crux
of the case was the cause of death. Plaintiff's medical experts
testified that death resulted from asphyxia; the defendant's medi-
cal experts maintained that death resulted from a heart attack that
had no medical relation to the anaesthesia. Each counsel's chance
of success depended on persuading the jury that his experts were
the more credible. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff; it would probably
have affirmed had the jury accepted the defense-experts' version.
In Christensen v. Northern States Power Co.' a plaintiff did not
supply needed expert testimony, and the Supreme Court held that
he had not adduced sufficient proof. The plaintiff's lake, well-
stocked in the autumn, had no fish in it the following spring. The
defendant's 66,000 volt power line was supported by a tower
rising out of the lake bed. In mid-winter ice pressure tipped the
tower and the current was grounded for four seconds. The plaintiff
claimed that his fish were electrocuted; but he introduced no expert
proof to substantiate this claim. That high voltage electricity de-
stroys life is common knowledge; but it is not commonly known-
if it is in fact true at all-that electricity grounded in the center of
a large lake charges the waters of the entire lake.
Sometimes scientific problems take unexpected turns; and as-
pects that seem important to counsel detract attention from other
crucial issues. In the recent interesting case of De Vere v. Parten6
the plaintiff suffered transverse myelitis which she claimed was
caused by breathing fumes in the defendant's manufacturing plant,
where she worked. Soon after the defendant had started using a
process volatilizing carbon tetrachloride the plaintiff sickened and
later became paralyzed from the waist down.
No doubt counsel for both sides supposed that this case was one
like the dentist case discussed above-that the crucial question
was: did paralysis result from carbon tetrachloride poisoning? The
plaintiff's lawyer was specially concerned, since in all previous
medical history no case of transverse myelitis had been ascribed
to carbon tetrachloride poisoning. As in the dentist case, the experts
4. 214 Minn. 492,8 N. W. 2d 818 (1943).
5. 222 Minn. 474, 25 N. W. 2d 659 (1946). Cf. Homer v. Micholson, 198
Minn. 55, 268 N. W. 852 (1936).
6. 222 Minn. 211, 23 N. W. 2d 584 (1946).
19501
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disagreed; three testified for the plaintiff that carbon tetrachloride
poisoning caused her paralysis; and the defendant countered with
contradictory testimony.
But a less spectacular issue was also crucial. Did the plaintiff
contract carbon tetrachloride poisoning? On cross-examination the
plaintiff's witnesses testified that carbon tetrachloride fumes are
poisonous only when they exceed 100 parts to a million parts of air.
The defendant had used no more than three gallons of carbon tetra-
chloride a week which would produce no more than two parts to a
million of air. The report of the case indicates no direct disproof
of the inference that the plaintiff was not subjected to a poisonous
concentration. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal
of a new trial after verdict for the defendant, and stated that the
verdict was the only possible one under the circumstances.
The plaintiff's council no doubt foresaw that he needed proof
of poisoning. His experts testified that the plaintiff showed dis-
tinctive symptoms of carbon tetrachloride poisoning. Three other
persons who worked in the same room also showed the symptoms.
The court's statement-that verdict for the defendant was the
only proper jury finding-implies that the proof of symptoms was
not sufficient evidence, under the circumstances, to justify a finding
that the plaintiff had been poisoned. But proof of the symptoms at
least develops an unexplained inconsistency. Either proof of lethal
concentration was in error, or the symptoms were unteliable, or
special conditions resulted in uneven concentration, or some other
scientific explanation accounts for this inconsistency. Of course, the
plaintiff has the burden of proof on causation, and in the absence of
explanation of this inconsistency the court's holding was not im-
proper. The lesson of the De Vere case is that scientific demonstra-
tion may be far from simple. On complicated technical issues the
focus of interest can shift from one aspect to another. Success de-
pends on thorough understanding of much more than law. Counsel
must educate himself in the relevant sciences and develop relatively
complete opportunity of pre-trial investigation.
C. Circumstantial Evidence
Nearly all proof presupposes that the fact-triers will draw some
inferences. Normally the process goes on without special note.
But in some cause cases the circumstantial nature of proof comes
spectacularly to the fore.
In Paine v. Gamble Stores7 the plaintiff proved that her decedent
7. 202 Minn. 462, 279 N. W. 257 (1938). See also Silver v. Harbison,
178 Minn. 271, 226 N. W. 932 (1929).
[Vol. 34:185
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MINNESOTA
left home one afternoon and was found dead the following morning
at the bottom of the stair-well that afforded entrance to the defen-
dant's basement. The stair-well abutted on -a public alley. It was
originally guarded by a two-pipe railing; but the top rail pro-
tecting the deep end had been missing for some time. Plaintiff's
counsel was faced with the problem of proving that: (1) decedent's
entry was over the improperly guarded end, and not over the
properly guarded side or through the gate at the head of the
stairs; and that (2) the decedent was not pushed, but fell into
the well. (The plaintiff did not have the burden of proving decedent
free from contributory negligence; he was presumed to have used
due care.)
The proof that tended to show that entry was over the end was:
the position and condition of the body when found was consistent
with a fall over the end; prongs of the deceased's ring setting were
scratched and a fresh scratch on the end-wall could have been made
by them; undisturbed dust and rubbish on the steps was inconsistent
with a fall down them. The proof that tended to show that the
decedent was not pushed into the well was: the body showed no
marks of violence other than the broken neck which obviously re-
sulted from the fall; no signs of a struggle near the stair-well could
be found. This evidence was held sufficient to support a verdict for
the plaintiff.
The preparation of such a case is virtually detective work.
Fortunately for the plaintiff the body was found by the police who
made a thorough investigation before the site was disturbed and
who were available as witnesses.
Sometimes circumstantial evidence is substituted for more costly
expert testimony. In Ellis v. Lindmarks the plaintiff ordered cod-
liver oil from a drug store. Negligence of the druggist and his
wholesaler resulted in delivery of linseed oil, which the plaintiff
used in poultry mash. The plaintiff's thousand-chicken flock did not
prosper as it had in prior years. Over the defendant's objection,
the plaintiff was allowed to prove that other chicken raisers had
similar experiences. The Supreme Court held this evidence com-
petent. The court did not discuss the sufficiency of this relatively
weak proof that the unusual diet caused the deterioration of the
flock. The defendants, who had to answer to many poultry raisers
on similar claims, were unlikely to have overlooked the causation
issue. The defendant's failure to offer expert proof implies that
they had investigated and found the facts against them-they
8. 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929).
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were unlikely to have rested their case if they had favorable
scientific evidence without offering it. Though the plaintiff had
the burden of proof, -consideration of these practicalities probably
explains why no attack was made on his relatively weak case on
causation. The burden of proof is a practical and not merely a
logical facet of the administration of justice.
At long range the kibitzer is lead to wonder why the plain-
tiff's lawyer risked the sufficiency of this evidence. The significance
of the holding, for this discussion, however, is that this kind of
evidence can be used to establish cause. It may be persuasive and
useful when expert testimony is unavailable or too costly. Of course
it is subject to rebuttal. The defendant's expert testimony may
discredit it entirely. And defense counsel might be able to return
it in kind. If some flock had flourished on the substitute, the in-
ference of causal connection between the linseed oil diet and flock
infirmity would be impaired.
IL Distinguishing between Proximate and Remote Causes
In the cases discussed both litigants and courts assumed that
the crucial causation problem was an issue of non-legal fact. These
cases were discussed-and decided-without any special definition
of cause. When, the cause issue is one of fact almost any legal defini-
tion of cause is fool-proof. "Natural and probable consequence,"
"substantial factor," "material element," "direct cause," "uninter-
rupted chain of events," "absence of superceding causes" are all
unlikely to mislead counsel, judge, or jury. Errors on the trial of
such an issue are almost sure to be improper rulings on the ad-
missibility or weight of evidence, rather than errors of statement
and application of the substantive law of proximate cause.
But in other cases, even after unequivocal proof of exactly
what happened, a problem still remains-is the defendant to blame
for the plaintiff's injury? Even though a defendant's wrong is a
cause-in-fact of harm, he is liable only if his wrong is a "proximate,"
rather than a "remote" cause. How is this discrimination made?
Most of the cases in which the need for distinguishing between
proximate and remote causes occurs, fall into one of the two fol-
lowing classes:
(1) Cases in which, even though the plaintiff's injury is in fact
an aftermath or consequence of the defendant's wrong,9 neverthe-
less, the connection between the wrong and the injury is fortuitous.
9. Which is somewhat different from being an "effect" or "result" (in
the scientific sense of these words) of the defendants wrong.
[Vol. 34:185
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MINNESOTA
The outcome of the defendant's misconduct has tended to be
peculiar or unique.
The common sense form of the question which these cases raise
can be stated like this: Is the defendant to blame for such a con-
sequence, or is the injury just an accidental upshot for which the
defendant should not be held?
When injuries are routine this question does not occur. If a
motorist negligently runs down a careful pedestrian and breaks
his leg, which mends in the ordinary way, no one would question
that the break, resultant routine medical and hospital expenses,
pedestrian's loss of time at an ordinary occupation, and typical
mental pain and suffering are all proximately caused by the negli-
gence. In such a case the legal issue of proximate cause (as dis-
tinguished from problems of proof) is only a formal issue, and is
decided in the plaintiff's favor without dispute.
(2) Cases in which the plaintiff's injury is the aftermath of both
the defendant's wrongdoing and some other force-either the mis-
conduct of a third person or a malevolent turn of nature. Some
other antecedent competes with the defendant's wrong as the
author of the plaintiff's harm. (Of course the defendant is not
necessarily relieved from responsibility even though another ante-
cedent is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. There may be
more than one proximate cause of an injury. The defendant's wrong
may also be a proximate cause.10 )
The common sense form of the question which these cases raise
can be stated like this: Is the defendant at least partially to blame
for this injury, or is another antecedent to be adjudged solely
responsible for it?
In these cases even though the defendant's wrong fortuitously
sets the stage for some other antecedent (which would have been
harmless had the defendant not misbehaved) yet the defendant's
part in the misadventure may-or may not-pale into insignificance.
These two identifying classes of proximate cause cases are not
mutally exclusive. Some cases fall in both classes. The classification
is only a descriptive aid identifying remoteness problems, and is of
no value in proceeding further to solutions. Since remoteness prob-
lems are problems of determining what legal consequences attach
to certain kinds of facts, the lawyer naturally turns to rules of law
for solutions.
10. Cooper v. Hoeglund, 221 Minn. 446, 22 N. W. 2d 450 (1946) ; Ellis
v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929) ; Hall v. Minneapolis St
R., 223 Minn. 243, 26 N. W. 2d 178 (1947).
1950]
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A. The Natural and Probable Consequence Rule-
Foreseeability as a Test
One of the most popular judicial formulations for dealing with
proximate cause is: A defendant is liable only for the natural and
probable consequences of his wrong. This rule had vogue in Min-
nesota in the 19th century, but was repudiated by Mr. Justice
Mitchell in Christianson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R.11 in 1896.
Nevertheless later discussion will show that experience with the
rule is not without significance for present-day Minnesota advo-
cates.
Wherever the rule has been used, it has been interpreted to
mean that the defendant is liable only for foreseeable consequences
-consequences which a reasonable man in the defendant's position
could anticipate.
Mr. Justice Mitchell pointed out that foresight of harm bears
on another issue-negligence. Only when a reasonable man in the
defendant's position can appreciate risk may a defendant be held
negligent.1 2 But a defendant is not necessarily innocent of negligence
when he cannot foresee the details of the harm he may do. Unreason-
ably high speed on highways causes various kinds of accidents and
produces a great variety of -damages. Without foreknowledge of
the particular accidents that may happen and of the exact harms
that may flow from them, the reasonable man recognizes the impru-
dence of excessively high speeds.
. Once an accident has occurred it is always a specific accident
that happened in a particular way and resulted in discrete harms.
When, after the event, the question is asked, was the particular
accident and resulting damage foreseeable, the cases fall into three
classes:
(1) In some cases the accident and the resulting damages are
so typical that judges and jurors cannot be convinced that they
were unforeseeable. If the defendant argues that insignicant details
could not be foreseen his position sounds silly and does not merit
serious consideration.
(2) In some cases the freakishness of the facts refuses to be
submerged, and any description that minimizes it is viewed as a
suppression of important facts.
11. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640 (1896). But see Guile v. Greenberg, 192
Minn. 548, 257 N. W. 649 (1934) ; Wedel v. Johnson, 196 Minn. 170, 264
N. W. 689 (1936). Prosser has collected some of the earlier opinions which
treat the natural-and-probable-consequence- rule with respect. 21 Minn. L.
Rev. 19,29, n. 54 (1936).
12. Foresight of harm is not the only requirement. One may reasonably
take known, and even great, risks under some circumstances.
[Vol. 34:185
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For example, in a recent Louisiana case13 the defendant negli-
gently left his truck on a highway at night without setting out
lights or flares. A car crashed into the truck and caught fire. The
plaintiff came to the rescue of the occupants-a man and wife. After
he got them out of the car, he returned to get a floor mat to pillow
the injured wife's head. He picked up a pistol which lay on the
floor of the car and handed it to the husband. The husband was
temporarily deranged and shot the plaintiff in the leg. Such a
consequence of negligently leaving the truck in the highway is
unforeseeable.
(3) Between these two types of cases is a third class in which
the consequences are neither typical nor wildly freakish. In these
cases the unusual details are arguably-but only arguably-sig-
nificant. If they are held to be significant then the consequences are
unforeseeable; but if they are held to be unimportant then the con-
sequences are foreseeable.
For example, in a Texas case' 4 the plaintiff was one of two
men sent out on a service truck to tow a stalled car. The plaintiff
made the tow rope fast, and attempted to step out from between the
vehicles as the truck started. His artificial leg slipped into a mud
hole which had resulted from the defendant-railroad's disregard of
its statutory duty to maintain this portion of the highway. The
plaintiff was unable to extricate his peg leg and was in danger of
being run over by the car. He grabbed the tail gate of the truck to
use its force to pull him loose. A loop in the tow rope lassoed his
good leg, and it was broken.
As long as these details are considered significant facts of the
case the accident is unforeseeable. No doubt some courts would
stress them and reach that result. As a matter of fact the Texas
courts have on occasion ruled that much less freakish accidents
are unforeseeable. 1' But in the peg leg case the court quoted with
approval the plaintiff's lawyer's "description" of the "facts" which
was couched in these words: "The case stated in briefest form, is
simply this: Appellee was on the highway, using it in a lawful
manner, and slipped into this hole, created by appellant's negligence,
and was injured in attempting to extricate himself. .. ." The court
also adopted the plaintiff's answer to the defendant's attempt to
stress details, as follows: "Appellant contends . . . it could not
reasonably have foreseen that slipping into this hole would have
13. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1948).
14. Hines v. Morrow, 236 S. W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
15. E.g., Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R., 65 Tex. 274 (1896). -
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caused the appellee to have become entangled in a rope, and the
moving truck, with such dire results. The answer is plain: The
exact consequences do not have to be foreseen...."
In this third class of cases (which includes most, but not quite
all, of the cases raising real problems of remoteness) the foresee-
ability "test" can be applied only after the significant facts have been
described. If the description is detailed, the accident is called un-
foreseeable; if it is general the accident is called foreseeable. Since
there is no authoritative guide to how the facts should be described
the ostensible testing-power of the process is illusory.
This analysis has practical value for the Minnesota advocate
on two scores: (1) We shall see later that even though the natural-
and-probable-consequence rule has been repudiated, nevertheless
the Supreme Court has announced that foresight is a criterion of
proximity in some kinds of cases. (2) The problem of remoteness
involves a judgment on whether the defendant is to blame for the
plaintiff's injury; and those who judge-regardless of what formula
they use-tend to view the freak injury as the workings of malevo-
lent fate, rather than as responsibly caused by misconduct that
happens to trigger-off events culminating in that injury. A plaintiff,
therefore, is likely to dispose judges and jurors in his favor if he
persuades them that unusual aspects of the case are insignificant
details. On the other hand, a defendant may induce psychological
support if he can convince them that the freakish facts are a promi-
nent and significant part of the case. (Such advocacy is a fine art.
Counsel who overdoes it, strengthens, rather than weakens, his
opponent. If plaintiff's lawyer insists on a too-general discription
he appears to be trying to suppress important facts; if defense
counsel insists on a too-specific description, he patently tries to
take advantage of mere technicality.)
B. The Substantial Factor (or Material Element) Rule
In 1920 the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S. S. M. R.16 first used a criterion of remoteness like that formu-
lated some years before by Professor Jeremiah Smith, an outstand-
ing Harvard torts teacher.Y Smith suggested this rule: Only when
the defendant's wrong is a substantial factor in producing the
plaintiff's injury is the wrong a proximate cause of the injury.
A "factor in producing" an injury is a cause of that injury. The
16. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W. 45 (1920). See, Restatement, Torts § 431;
and Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause c. 5, pp. 136-141.
17. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223,
303 (1912).
[Vol. 34:185
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MINNESOTA
relationship of cause to consequence is, in fact, an all-or-none rela-
tionship. That is, either an event is, in fact a cause of another event,
or it is not. No event can be, in fact, an insubstantial cause of an-
other event. The reference, then, of the word "substantial" is not
factual. But a cause that is substantial-in-fact can be insubstantial in
law-a factual antecedent is not necessarily legally proximate. So I
conclude that the reference of the word is to legal substantiality. A
statement of the rule making this analysis explicit is: A legally
substantial cause is a proximate cause.
But since by definition only proximate causes are legally im-
portant (legally substantial), the "test" supplies only a new
synonym for a troublesome legal concept. This synonym is put
forward to solve difficulties not rooted in lack of words, but rooted
in lack of understanding. And since the synonym is, itself, undefined
it throws little new light on the nature of legal remoteness. When
the question, "Is this defendant to blame for this injury?" is hard
to answer, I get no more help from the substantial factor "test"
than from the term "proximate cause" used raw. Nor is meaning
added by appending "material element" (as was done in the
Anderson case) to "substantial factor." The materiality of a causal
relationship, once that relationship exists in fact, is likewise a legal
matter. Legally-material-cause is only another undefined substitute
for proximate cause.
Mr. Justice Loring voiced this impotency of the substantial
factor as a criterion of proximity in Walker v. Stecher.18 In that
case, two successive collisions with the plaintiff's automobile re-
sulted in injury. The defendant's car collided with the plaintiff's,
and shortly thereafter a third car hit it. Most of plaintiff's injuries
were incurred in the second collision. At the trial the jury charge
included the substantial-factor-and-material-element test. In the
Supreme Court the defendant unsuccessfully contended, in effect,
that the driver of the third car was to blame for the injuries result-
ing from the second collision, and that the defendant was not.
Mr. Justice Loring concurred on the ground that the defendant
had not objected to the tenor of the charge, but had objected only
to any submission of the issue. He said that he thought it was time
to recognize the inadequacy of the substantial-factor-and-material-
element rule-that the rule supplied definitions that needed defining
18. 219 Mlinn. 152, 17 N. W. 2d 317 (1944). Prosser concludes, "The
material element and substantial factor test is adequate as to the problem
of causation in fact, but is of no real assistance in dealing with other prob-
lems." 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 67 (1936).
1950]
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and in the absence of better instructions jurors might hold remote
causes proximate. I take Loring's objection to mean that he feared
jurors might think "substantial" to mean "substantial-in-fact," and
since all causes are substantial in fact jurors might fail to consider
the very problem submitted to them-whether a cause-in-fact is
also a proximate cause.
At any rate, such a fear materialized in Seward v. Minneapolis
St. R.19 The plaintiff had parked his truck, which had a defective
hand brake, on an uphill street. He went across the street to mail
letters, then turned around and saw his driverless truck backing
out into traffic. While trying to recapture his wayward vehicle, he
was run over by the defendant's street car. The proof tended to
show that the defendant's motorette saw the plaintiff's situation and
thereafter failed to use reasonable care for his safety. On the issue
of the proximity of the plaintiff's negligence to his injury, the trial
judge charged in terms of material-element-and-substantial-factor.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground (among others) that the jury needed more
guidance on the nature of proximate cause than the instruction gave
them-the very point that Loring had previously made.
C. Superceding Intervening Efficient Causes-Unbroken
Sequences
The Supreme Court, in the Seward case, did not reject the sub-
stantial factor theory as wrong. The theory was held inadequate.
For proper amplification the court borrowed from Mitchell's famous
opinion in the Christianson case20 in which (after rejecting the
natural and probable consequence rule) he said that proximate
consequences follow from the defendant's wrong in unbroken
sequence and without intervening efficient causes. This approach
sets the problem of distinguishing between intervening causes legally
sufficient to supercede the defendant's misconduct and those which
are not.
In practically no disputable proximity case is the defendant's
wrong the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury. Were every force
that intervenes a superceding cause plaintiffs would lose virtually
all arguable proximate cause cases. Intervening forces are, by defi-
nition, efficient-in-fact-that is, the injury would not have happened
without them. But when are they efficient-in-law-legally sufficient
to insulate the defendant from liability?
19. 222 Minn. 454, 25 N. W. 2d 221 (1946).
20. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640 (1896). Cf. supra p. ......
[Vol. 34:185
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The problem is at bottom: Is the defendant at least partially
to blame for this injury, or is this other antecedent solely respon-
sible for it? The stage is set psychologically to urge either the
efficiency or dependence of an intervening force by either stressing
or minimizing its blameworthiness in proof and argument. When
the intervening force has a human author this aspect of advocacy is
particularly open to development (and sometimes overlooked). The
defense counsel should fully develop proof on the enormity of an
intervening wrong; the plaintiff's lawyer should be equally alert
in capitalizing on proof that minimizes the wrong. The cataclysmic
or relatively bland character of an intervening natural force has
similar psychological importance. These psychological aspects are
not always controlling, but they have had a part in forming some
of the legal doctrines which will now be discussed.
Robinson v. Butler2' is one of the latest Minnesota cases in
which the identification of superceding causes was considered. The
plaintiff-motorist was forced onto the right-hand shoulder of a two-
lane highway when the defendant overtook and passed him in the
face of nearby oncoming traffic. A panicky front-seat passenger
grabbed the plaintiff's stearing wheel, and pulled the car back onto
and across the road where it collided with a telegraph pole.
The court held the passenger's act was an intervening efficient
cause, and relieved the defendant from liability for the plaintiff's
injuries. After quoting from Mitchell's famous opinion in the
Christianson case (which rejected foresight as a test of proximate
cause) nevertheless the court justified its holding that the passen-
ger's act was a superceding cause on the ground that it was m-
foreseeable-that it was not the normal response to the situation
created by the defendant and was so extraordinary that it con-
stituted an intervening efficient cause. And since most, if not all,
hard issues of remoteness can be analyzed as intervening cause
issues, Mitchell's repudiation of the foresight test is no longer a safe
guide to advocacy.
The explanation of this re-recognition of the relevance of fore-
sight is rooted in the psychology of the problem. Fact-triers who
must ascribe blame tend to try to distinguish between accidental
aftermaths of wrongdoing on the one hand, and expected results
of wrongdoing on the other. Attempts to escape from the sig-
21. 226 Minn. 491, 33 N. W. 2d 821 (1948): Cf. Edbled v. Brower, 178
Minn. 465, 227 N. W. 493 (1929); Fjellman v. Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7
N. W. 2d 521 (1942); Shuster v. Vechhi, 203 Minn. 76, 279 N. W. 841
(1938) : Prosser, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 37-57 (1936).
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nificance of foresight in the field of legal remoteness are attempts
to escape from our culture.
But nevertheless -a foresight criterion is incapable of perform-
ing a testing function in the hard cases in which a test is needed. In
the Robinson case the theory is not inconsistent with a judgment for
the plaintiff if the "facts" are "described" a bit more generally. 22
It could be said that the defendant could anticipate that if he forced a
car off the road the judgment of its occupants might be impaired
so that they would further jeopardize their safety.
This is the dilemma: Foresight is not psychologically irrelevant
to the solution of problems of remoteness and often affects the
judgment of those who try them. Yet foresight cannot function as
a test until the facts of the case are described, and since the facts are
nearly always susceptible of differing descriptions which will vary
the result, a foresight criterion cannot function in a true testing
process.
A realization of this dilemma is of little value to judges-except
insofar as knowledge that no definite answer lies this wy may send
them elsewhere for decisions, jury charges, and rules. But the
advocate who must argue such issues in the tradition set by the
courts may find the analysis useful in plumbing the inescapable
psychology of decision and countering an opponent who makes a
noise which purports to be eternal verity.
D. Uncertainty of Outcome of Remoteness Issue
The general rules of the Minnesota law of proximate cause do
not tend to make the law certain. This conclusion comes as no
shock to trial lawyers accustomed to this (and many other) uncer-
tainties in damage suits, and who constantly take the perils of liti-
gation into account in negotiations for settlement. 23
But the statement that general rules have not fostered certainty
does not mean that the outcome of remoteness issues is always un-
predictable. In some kinds of cases specialized rules and precedents
are as sound a basis for prediction as are the rules of any branch
of the law.
For example, in the recent Minnesota case of Ben esh v.
Garvais,24 the plaintiff, injured by the negligence of street car
22. Cf. Court's reasoning in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &
S. S. M. R., 146 Minn. 430; 179 N. W. 45 (1920).
23. "Proximate cause presents questions of extraordinary difficulty;
most writers have concluded they cannot be reduced to definite rules."
Prosser, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 20 (1936).
24. 221 Minn. 1, 20 N. W. 2d 532 (1945). Cf. Homer v. Micholson,
198 Minn. 55, 268 N. W. 852 (1936) ; Sporna v. Kalina, 184 Minn. 89; 237
N. W. 841 (1931).
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operators, sought treatment from a physician who negligently
burned her with an electrically operated therapeutic device. One
issue was: Were these burns proximately cause by the negligence
of the carmen? The court cited eight similar Minnesota cases in
which an original wrongdoer was held to have proximately caused
further injuries resulting from medical treatment, and stated that
the law on this point should be considered settled. The court has
recently affirmed its well-known view that lack of a driver's license
is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from unlicensed
driving.25 The court has also recently held that the negligence of
one person imperilling a second is the proximate cause of injuries
to a reasonable rescuer coming to the aid of the second. 26 No doubt
other examples will occur to experienced lawyers, and one could
find many more by spending a short time in routine research.
Proximate cause cases are often unique and precedents closely
in point will not be found. Common sense is some guide to the
likelihood of finding precedents and specialized rules. Some cases
are so patently unusual that the experienced counsel knows off-hand
that he is unlikely to find authority closely in point. Others are
obviously of a kind that are so likely to recur that protracted search
is almost sure to yield up authority. The danger of too little re-
search is usually greater than the danger of wasting time. Research
should not be confined to local materials. Most courts, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court is no exception, pay some attention to
decisions in other jurisdictions on hard questions of proximity.2 7
One recently formulated Minnesota specialized rule deserves
special mention. In Medved v. Doolittle28 the car which carried
plaintiff's decedent crashed into a disabled truck wrongfully left on
the highway. The driver of the car, decedent's husband, testified
that he saw the truck when over a half a mile from it and noted that
the intervening distance was shrinking rapidly, but nevertheless he
supposed the truck was moving and failed to keep a proper lookout.
About 500 other cars passed the truck without incident on the two
unblocked lanes of the three lane highway. The trial court submitted
the proximate cause issue to the jury which returned a verdict for
the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the negligence
25. Mahowald v. Bechrich, 212 Minn. 78. 2 N, W. 2d 569 (1942)
26. Duff v. Bemidji Motor Service Co., 210 Minn. 456, 299 N. W. 196
(1941).
27. E.g., Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N. W. 2d 788 (1945);
Fjellman v. Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N. W. 2d 521 (1942).
28. Cf. Kulla v. E. B. Crabtree Co., 203 Minn. 105, 280 N. W. If(1938).
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of the husband was a superceding cause. The court stressed the
husband's discovery of the truck in time to avert the accident and
his subsequent negligence, and distinguished the case from others
in which the obstruction was not discovered. The court then
formulated a rule to this effect: If a negligent act 20 of a third party
intervenes between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's injury,
and if the third party has discovered the facts constituting danger
and thereafter fails to exercise reasonable care, then the third
*party's misconduct is a superceding cause.
This rule of the Medved case is definite enough to control deci-
sions in a limited area. If the Supreme Court continues to respect
it then one area of the law of proximate cause will become relatively
certain in Minnesota. But will the rule stand?
A similar, though more drastic, rule once had considerable
vogue. In Vicars v. Wilcox"0 an English court formulated a "last
wrongdoer" rule which insulated defendants from liability when-
ever the wrong of another intervened between their misconduct and
the plaintiff's harm. That rule has been repudiated in nearly all
jurisdictions, including Minnesota 1 It operated too arbitrarily.
Often it relieved wrongdoers who, in common judgment, were
clearly at least partially to blame for the plaintiff's injury.
This same sort of dissatisfaction may develop with the less
drastic, but still arbitrary, discovered-peril rule of the Medved case.
The decision of that case is not unacceptable when the facts of the
flagrance of the husband's wrong and the slight fault of the de-
fendant are kept in mind. But there will be other cases in which the
'original wrongdoer will be guilty of more serious fault and the
intervening wrongdoer will be less culpable. Perhaps such cases will
tempt the court to modify or abandon the rule as now formulated.32
29. Cf. Arnold v. Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297
N. W. 182 (1941) in which the intervening wrong was a failure to act.
30. 8 East 1 (1806).
31. Cf. Edblad v. Brower, 178 Minn. 465; 227 N. W. 493 (1929)
Arnold v. Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N. W. 182 (1941);
Butler v. Northwestern Hospital, 202 Minn. 282, 278 N. W. 37 (1938)
Walker v. Stecher, 219 Minn. 152, 17 N. W. 2d 317 (1944); Hall v. Minne-
apolis St. R., 223 Minn. 243, 26 N. W. 2d 178 (1947) ; Ellis v. Lindmark, 177
Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929) ; Roadman v. C. E. Johnson Motor Sales
Co., 210 Minn. 59, 297 N. W. 166 (1941). See Prosser on Torts, pp. 243-249,
316 (1941).
32. On the other hand a similar formulation has been used for years in
Minnesota in judging whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence remains
a proximate cause of his injury if the defendant, after discovering his peril
is therafter negligent. See Seward v. Minneapolis St. R., 222 Minn. 454,
25 N. W. 2d 221 (1946) ; Fonda v. St. Paul City R., 71 Minn. 438 (1898).
This is, of course, quite a different problem when viewed from the vantage
point of public policy.
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Counsel should be cautious in either banking on or disregarding
this rule.
III. Liability When Misconduct Does Not, in Fact, Cause Harm
The actual cause problems discussed in section I occured in
cases in which clearly the defendant was not to blame for the
plaintiff's injury unless the injury was, in fact, an effect of the
defendant's misconduct. The remoteness problems discussed in
section II usually occur in cases in which the plaintiff's injury is,
in fact, a consequence of the defendant's misconduct. Since these
two types of cases nearly exhaust the field, it is almost accurate to
say that a causal-relation-in-fact is a prerequisite of liability. But
there are exceptions and qualifications.
In a recent California case33 two of three hunting companions
simultaneously and independently mistook their fellow for game
and each fired at him. One pellet of shot entered his eye. The
plaintiff, of course, could not prove which defendant hit him.
The court had two alternatives: relieve both blameworthy de-
fendants or hold both. It chose the latter, which seems the more
sensible. But one of the defendant's misconduct did not, in fact,
cause the injury.3 4
The connection-in-fact between misconduct and harm is not
strictly causal when two independent forces, each of which would
have produced the whole injury alone, strike simultaneously or
after merging. It cannot be said that both or each in fact caused
the harm, since the harm would have occurred if either were
absent. It cannot be said that neither in fact caused the injury
because the injury would not have happened if both were absent. All
that can be said is that either would have caused the injury if the
other were absent-which means each would have been a cause
under other circumstances.
Nevertheless appropriate legal disposition of many of these
cases is quite clear. In the classical case of Corey v. Havener33 two
motorcyclists simultaneously frightened the plaintiff's horse. The
acts of either probably would have caused results as dire had the
33. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948).
34. In the similar case of Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 832, 110 So. 666(1926) the court reached the same result. The plaintiff was a stranger to the
hunting party and the court was able to dub the two hunters "joint enter-
prisers" and thus justify liability on an agency theory. This approach was
not open to the California Court in the Tice case. The California plaintiff was
a member of the hunting party; and if the defendants were liable for each
other's wrong as joint enterprisers, the plaintiff would also be barred by his
vicarious responsibility as a joint enterpriser.
35. 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E. 69 (1902).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
other been absent. The court had no difficulty in holding them both
to blame for the plaintiff's injuries as cotortfeasors.
But cases are not always so simple. The fact that the harm
would have occurred without the defendant's misconduct sometimes
throws great psychological doubt on whether the defendant was
to blame for the harm, and that doubt is reflected in the cases. The
Minnesota court was confronted with a knotty problem of this
sort in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R.31 A great
fire and a small fire, after merging, swept onto the plaintiff's land.
Arguably the great fire was not set by the defendant. The plaintiff
probably would have suffered devastating loss if the defendant's
fire had never been set. The Supreme Court approved a submission
of the case to the jury under instructions to the effect that if the
defendant's fire was a material or substantial element in causing
the plaintiff's damages, then the defendant was liable. This instruc-
tion seems to be calculated to turn the jury loose with a hard
problem of ascribing blame. Some courts have attempted to develop
specialized rules for this sort of case, which have the advantage
of stabilizing the law and controlling the jury, but at the same time
produce arbitrary results.
3 7
In these multiple cause cases the central problem is: Should the
defendant be held to blame for the injury, even though, in an ab-
stract sense, causal connection in fact is absent. Such issues are
sometimes easy and sometimes hard. They are problems, at base,
of the appropriate legal consequences to be attached to the thor-
oughly understood facts; and, as such, they resemble problems in
remoteness, rather than problems of actual cause which are solved
by proof. Defense counsel should be prepared and permitted to
stress lack of the cause-consequence relationship-that lack is not
totally irrelevant; it bears on, but does not foreclose, the lack of the
blame-for relationship. But the possibility of liability transcend-
ing the limits of harm which would have occurred even if the de-
fendant had not been guilty of misconduct inheres in the nature of
the blame-for relationship.
IV. Minnesota Analyses-Actual Cause Problems or
Remoteness Problems
Normally the character of actual cause problems differs so
patently from the character of remoteness problems that likelihood
36. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W. 45 (1920).
37. Cf. Kingston v. Chicago Northwestern R., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N. W.
913 (1927).
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of confusion is small. But a few modem Minnesota cases are
puzzling and deserve special analysis.
In Geisen v. Luce3" the plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident. The defendant had left his stalled car on the highway in
violation of statute but under circumstances which justified his
conduct. The plaintiff was a passenger in a car which approached
the stalled car from the rear. The driver of the plaintiff's car was
travelling at a high rate of speed, and, even though his view ahead
was obstructed, he pulled over to the left side of the road to pass
the stalled car. A car was coming from the opposite direction and
the plaintiff's host saw that a head-on collision was imminent. The
stalled car obstructed the right side of the road, so the host pulled
off the highway to the left and the car upset.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not liable. This
result was justifiable on two grounds: (1) defendant was not negli-
gent; and (2) even if he were, the host was guilty of such serious
fault that his wrong was a superceding cause. But the court also
announced this theory: The accident would have happened even
if the stalled car had been moving slowly. In fact, were it moving
slowly, passing time would increase and danger would be prolonged.
Since slow movement was not forbidden by statute there was no
causal connection-in-fact between the breach of statute and the
accident.
Of course more time is needed to pass a moving car than a
stalled one. But it does not follow that cats parked on the highway
do not constitute an undesirable passing hazard. And it does not
follow that if a parked car were not parked it would be moving
slowly. The cause-in-fact relationship between leaving the car
on the road and the upset was sufficient for liability. The sound
bases for deciding for the defendant were lack of negligence and re-
moteness.
This conclusion is buttressed by the later decision of Fleenor v.
Rawley.30 In that case the plaintiff's host collided with the defend-
ant's car wrongfully left on the highway to avoid a head-on collision
with a car approaching from the opposite direction. The court was
not willing to reason that this defendant too should escape liability
on the ground that the collision would have happened even if the
defendant's car had been moving slowly. Such a result would have
been unpalatable because this defendant was clearly at fault and
38. 185 Minn. 479, 242 N. W. 8 (1932).
39. 198 Minn. 163, 269 N. W. 370 (1936). See also Bartley v. Fritz,
205 Minn. 192,285 N. W. 464 (1939).
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the negligence of the plaintiff's host was not as flagrant as that of
the host in the Geisen case. The defendant was held liable. However
the court did not repudiate the troublesome reasoning in the Geisen
case. The court distinguished the cases on the ground that in the
earlier case the host left the road and in the later case the host
collided with the defendant's car. The court says that movement in-
creases the danger to passing cars but decreases the danger of rear-
end collision. But in either event the increase or decrease of risk
is insignificant if the slow movement is slow enough.
The analysis of Draxton v. Matzmerek40 might cause similar
trouble. The defendant approached and drove through an inter-
section at a speed between 15 and 20 miles per hour. The speed
limit within fifty feet of and through obstructed intersections was
15 miles per hour. The plaintiff, a small boy, was coasting down
the intersecting street that ran at right angles to the defendant's
path. A heav37 snow had fallen, and plowing had piled up banks
high enough to hide the "belly busting" plaintiff from the approach-
ing defendant's view. Plaintiff collided with the defendant's rear
bumper. One of the issues was: Was the defendant's wrongful
speed a proximate cause of the accident?
Evidence tended to show that the speed of the car was only
causal in the sense that it happened to get the car to the site of the
accident; it did not deprive the defendant of opportunities he might
otherwise have had to avoid the imminent accident. In other words,
the accident was, at most, a consequence of the speed, rather than
an effect of it.
The Supreme Court held that the speed was not a proximate
cause of the injury-a holding with which I have no quarrel. Much
of the opinion is couched in terms which classify the accident as a
remote consequence of the speed, and therefore a consequence for
which the defendant was not liable-analysis which is certainly
justifiable.
Some of the language used in the opinion might be interpreted
to mean that the accident was not even a consequence-in-fact of
the defendant's negligent speed. The court stresses proof that if,
at the time the defendant entered the intersection, his speed had
been instantaneously reduced far below the speed limit, the plaintiff
would have collided with the car anyway. The distance between the
curb line and the accident is not given in the opinion, but was
probably only a few feet. The evidence did show that the defendant
had been exceeding the speed limit for at least fifty feet before he
40. 203 Minn. 161, 280 N. W. 288 (1938).
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reached the curb line. This focus on the last few instants before the
accident, coupled with the implicit exclusion of prior events, gives
the idea of cause a queer twist. In almost every collision case at
some small distance from the crash an instantaneous reduction to
permissible speed would not prevent collision. So if such an analysis
were pressed to its logical conclusion negligent speed could hardly
ever cause a collision. The proper analysis of the Draxton case is
to view it as a problem involving the distinction between proximate
and remote consequences; it cannot be disposed of on the basis
that the collision was no consequence at all.4
1
This point can perhaps be clarified by considering the famous
Minnesota case of Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, Topeka, &
Santa Fe R-.4 The defendant railroad was negligent in failing to
inform a connecting carrier that a carload of goods was in the Kan-
sas City yards. This negligence delayed the shipment until the
goods were overtaken by an extraordinary flood. The Kansas City
yards were not, ordinarily, a dangerous place. Only by coincidence
was the loss a consequence of the negligence. Had the defendant
happened to make the mistake at another time no such injury was
likely. And had the goods happened to have been hauled into the
yards a few days later they would have been destroyed just as they
were even though notice were given promptly. And yet the Supreme
Court found sufficient connection in fact for liability-as have many
other courts in similar cases." The quality of the relation in fact
between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's injury in the
Bibb case does not differ from that in the Draxton case. In both
cases the problem is one of the legal proximity or remoteness of a
factual consequence-and the cases are different when viewed as
problems in determining what consequences entail liability.44
41. "... If defendant drives through St. Paul at sixty miles an hour, and
arrives in Minneapolis in time to be struck by a falling tree, his speed is
clearly a cause of the accident, since without it he would not have been
there when the tree fell; if he is not liable to his passenger, it is because his
negligence did not extend to such a risk. The term 'proximate' is applied
to these more or less undefined considerations which determine liability,
even where the fact of causation is clearly established." Prosser, 21 Minn. L.
Rev. 19, 22-23 (1936).
42. 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W. 709 (1905).
43. Accord: Green Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R., 130 Iowa 123, 106 N. W. 498 (1906). The older authorities are well mar-
shaled in the Bibb case itself. Prosser is critical of the result and states
authorities contra, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 52 (1936).
44. The factual relation cause-consequence between defendant's mis-
conduct and plaintiff's injury is sometimes also suppressed by calling the
results of defendant's misconduct "condition," rather than causes. See Hamil-
ton v. Vare, 184 Minn. 580, 239 N. W. 659 (1931).
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V. Public Policy and Causation
In these times legal writers are prone to display a lively interest
in the justification or criticism of the workings of the law in action.
But in some areas not much of profit can be said about public
policy. Causation seems to me to be one such area. Though others
have often said that problems of remoteness are at bottom prob-
lems of policy, little that has been written throws much light on
how causation problems can best be solved to serve society." The
reasons for the sterility of a policy approach may be of interest.
Deeply rooted in our culture is the postulate that a wrongdoer
should have to pay only for the harm he does. That notion seems so
natural and right that other alternatives seldom occur to us. An
injury that does not happen to have a significant relation in fact
to a wrongful act is not likely to have a significant relation in
law to it. We would think it arbitrary, disorderly, or unworkable to
allow an injured person to elect just any wrongdoer as a candidate
for liability. Nor would we be happy with some system in which
injuries and misbehavior were aligned on a chance scheme of
numbering, alphabetizing, or propinquity.
The law of remoteness may relieve a defendant from liability
even though the plaintiff's harm is, in fact, a consequence of that
wrong. Some say that non-liability for remote consequences is
justified on the theory that responsibility should be neither too
great in size nor too persistent in time. Were this the central policy
problem of the law of remoteness it would merit extended discus-
sion. Courts have been concerned with holding responsibility within
reasonable time and space bounds, but only occasionally have they
couched this concern in terms of remoteness. More typically a proxi-
mity problem involves a claim of no tremendous proportions and
for harm that culminated not long after the defendant's misconduct.
For example in Gilman v. Noyes" the defendant left the plain-
tiff's gate open, and the plaintiff's sheep strayed and were eaten
by bears. Even if the bears were licking their chops within an hour,
and even if the sheep were worth only a few dollars, this case
would still involve a problem of remoteness. The central question
of the case is: Is the defendant'to blame for this kind of loss? The
unusual quality of the relationship between the defendant's wrong
and the plaintiff's injury sets off this bother. A similar unusual
quality is noted when damage is unbelievably great or when slow
and tortuous workings of fate connect a wrong and loss. But most
45. E.g., Prosser, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 22, 27, 33 (1936).
46. 57 N. H. 627 (1876).
(Vol. 34:185
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MINNESOTA
of the cases involve neither exceptionally large nor greatly delayed
injuries.
Our acceptance of the notion that the blame-for relation is a
proper measure of responsibility is reflected in both (1) the usual
requirement that the defendant's misconduct be related in fact
to the plaintiff's injury, and (2) the limitation of liability to
"proximate" consequences. If the blame-for relation is our
starting point it is not unnatural that whenever the ordi-
nary layman is uncertain about the existence of that relation,
the law, too, is infected with the same uncertainty. Decisions of
cases resolve such doubts and when closely similar cases arise
thereafter the doctrine of stare decisis tends to stabilize the choices
previously made. Courts may also reduce uncertainty for wider
areas as they formulate principles with sufficient meaning to test
remoteness and proximity. But these stabilizing forces have never
operated extensively. Remoteness cases are likely to be unique, be-
cause the queer case is likely to raise a problm of remoteness.
There is, and there will probably continue to be, a large area
in which remoteness issues can be decided for either litigant. Never-
theless the population of this area is insignificant when compared to
the number of damage suits in which causation issues are not in
dispute. The policies that justify tort liability when no causation
issue is disputed will be relatively unaffected by the decision of re-
moteness issues one way or the other. The beneficial effects of the
law of torts as an instrument of social control and security are them-
selves limited; and other institutions must take up where the law of
torts leaves off. That the legal boundary between remote and
proximate consequences should be fringed or vague seems inevit-
able; and in cases close to the boundary there are no very potent
policy reasons that bear on the decision.
VI. Conclusions
The highlights of the implications of this paper that may be
most important to the Minnesota advocate are:
1. The advocate must discriminate clearly between two kinds of
causation issues: (1) cause-in-fact and (2) remoteness or proxi-
mity. The former involve problems of proof, and must be prepared
as problems of proof. The latter involve problems of argument and
must be prepared as problems of argument. Normally the distinc-
tion is easily made, but in a few situations Minnesota precedents
tend to make the discrimination more difficult.
2. The development of proof on an issue of cause-in-fact is
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sometimes routine, but such an issue often opens opportunities for
understanding ingenuity in the use of eye-witnesses, experts, and
circumstantial evidence and the like. In many of these cases the
successful advocate becomes a master of non-legal materials.
3. In developing arguments on a problem of remoteness counsel
should keep in mind the common sense form of putting the prob-
lem: Is the defendant to blame for this particular harm? This way
of looking at the proximate cause problem often supplies clues to
proper argument on both the psychological and doctrinal levels.
4. In all jurisdictions, and Minnesota is no exception, the gen-
eral definitions of proximate cause have insufficient descriptive
power to function as tests. Of course the court has from time to
time settled on appropriate jury charges, and the definitions of
proximate cause that will pass muster when the issue is submitted
to a jury can be found in the cases. It has changed from time to time
and may change further. In all arguable cases the outcome is not
uncertain. Precedents and specialized rules tend to settle the law of
remoteness for the kinds of cases that recur. Nevertheless many re-
moteness cases are unique, and cannot be settled in advance.
5. Though in. most remoteness cases the plaintiff's injury is a
consequence-in-fact of the defendant's misconduct, nevertheless
there are some areas in which a defendant is held to be to blame
for the plaintiff's injury even though from some abstract point of
view it could be argued that the injury is not a consequence-in-fact
of the defendant's wrong. The blame-for relationship is a superior
clue for the advocate.
6. The policy justifications for tort liability seldom have much
bearing on determining the close questions on the scope of liability.
Of course no case is only a proximate cause case, and policy argu-
ments may buttress positions for and against liability on some other
aspect of the damage suit. These arguments may have a psycho-
logical effect that exceeds their validity which opposing counsel
may find hard to combat. If the tribunal can be made to see the
issue clearly as an issue of the scope of liability, the irrelevance of
policy arguments to solution may also be made clear.
One important facet of advocacy has not been discussed in the
body of this paper-the compelling difference between representing
claimants and defending against claims. The plaintiff's lawyer in
all damage suits has, as a major objective, judgment at the trial
without reversible error. He and his client usually can ill afford re-
trials. His over-all strategy is "safety first." He should forego all
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doubtful advantages that fall short of being crucial. He must be
on well-approved ground in his plan of proof on actual cause
issues. He can seldom afford the security of directed verdicts on
issues of remoteness. Of course defense counsel makes no foolhardy
experiments, but victory at the trial has tremendous tactical value
for him, and he can afford some chances of reversal to obtain it.
